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THE TRANSFORMATION OF EU COMPETITION AND INTERNAL 
MARKET LAW BY THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT: 
COMPETENCE CREEPS INTO THE NATIONAL WELFARE STATES? 
 
Johan van de Gronden 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the financial and economic crisis the EU has taken measures to 
improve the economic governance of the Union as a whole and, more in par-
ticular, of the euro zone. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been heavily 
amended. Recently, the council clinched a deal on a bank union.1 A case in 
point is the adoption of the so-called six-pack2 and the conclusion of the Treaty 
on Stability Coordination and Governance (TSCG).3 The rules adopted address 
excessive budget deficits and macroeconomic imbalances of the EU Member 
States. The Commission and Council examine national budget plans (stability 
programmes of the euro countries and convergence programmes of the non-
euro countries) and, on the basis of their findings, direct guidelines and recom-
mendations at the Member States for the improvement of their financial and 
economic situations. Apart from requiring austerity measures, the guidelines and 
recommendations issued by the Commission and the Council raise issues such as 
the competitiveness of a particular Member State, the need to reform the social 
welfare states (e.g. labour and pension markets and social security) and the 
wish to prioritise growth-friendly expenditure (on, for example, education, re-
search, innovation and energy). 
The question arises how the new SGP rules relate to the ‘classic economic 
Treaty provisions’, i.e. EU competition and internal market law.4 The TFEU is 
based on the presumption that the Treaty provisions on competition and the 
internal market are concerned with the competition process in the EU, whereas 
the competences to organise the welfare state rest with the Member States. It is 
                                         
1  Brussels, 13 December 2012, 17739/12, PRESSE 528, available at http://www.con-
silium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/134265.pdf. 
2  The six-pack compromises of five Regulations and one Directive, which are published in 
issue L306 of OJ 2011. 
3  This Treaty is available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1478399/07_-
_tscg.en12.pdf. It should be noted that important Member States, such as the UK, are not 
party to this treaty. 
4  The Commission has issued proposals on the so-called ‘two-pack’. This concerns two draft 
regulations for monitoring Member States with excessive deficits or serious financial dif-
ficulties. These regulations are available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eco-
nomic_governance/index_en.htm. As these regulations are not adopted yet, they will not 
be discussed in this paper. 
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clear from the outset that the SGP rules are relevant for both the national 
economy and the organisation of the social welfare states. The aim of the pa-
per is to examine whether the SGP will transform EU competition and the inter-
nal market law, in so far as the social welfare competences of the Member 
States are concerned. Is the SGP capable of changing the impact of these pro-
visions of the TFEU on the social welfare state? In this regard, it should be noted 
that this paper does not discuss the stability mechanisms introduced to remedy 
high deficits of particular Member States, as these mechanisms are not directly 
related to issues which are also at play in EU competition and Internal market 
law.5 
The paper will start with discussing the SGP rules. Attention will be paid to 
the changes brought upon by the Treaty of Lisbon with regard to the SGP, to 
the six-pack and to the TSCG. This analysis will, however, mainly focus on the 
concrete recommendations directed at the Member States on the basis of the 
SGP rules. Subsequently, the interplay between the SGP rules and EU internal 
market law will be explored. To what extent are the free movement rules ap-
plicable to the social welfare states? What are the limits of the EU in adopting 
harmonization measures that aim at resolving problems resulting from social 
welfare state policies? Then, the interplay between the SGP and EU competi-
tion law will be discussed. Important issues, such as the application of the com-
petition rules to social security systems, will be raised. In this regard, it should 
be noted that the role that the EU state aid rules played, and still play, in the 
current crisis will not be analysed. For a great extent, these rules are applied 
to bailouts of banks and, as a result, in these cases no issues directly connected 
with the social welfare state are at play. This paper will end by drawing some 
conclusions. 
2.  THE SGP: ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN THE EU 
The Treaty of Lisbon has added new provisions on the economic and monetary 
policy to the TFEU. Some of them deal with the SGP. The principles laid down in 
these provisions are worked out in five regulations and one directive, which 
address the issues of excessive budget deficits and macroeconomic imbal-
ances.6 These measures are referred to as the six-pack. On top of that, the ma-
                                         
5  On the legal issues related to these stability mechanisms, see e.g. P. Athanassiou, Of Past 
Measures and Future Plans for Europe’s exit from the sovereign debt crisis: what us le-
gally possible (and what is not)?, European law Review 2011, p. 558 et seq. 
6  See Regulation 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and the Council amending 
Council Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary posi-
tions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ 2011 L306/12; 
Regulation 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on enforcement 
measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, OJ 2011 
L306/8; Regulation 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council amend-
ing Council Regulation 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
→ 
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jority of the Member States have concluded the TSCG. In this section, the gen-
eral framework of the SGP and its application in 2012, the first year that the 
new SGP rules were operative, will be discussed. 
2.1  The General framework of the SGP 
Article 126 (1) TFEU provides that Member States must avoid excessive gov-
ernment deficits. According to the famous Maastricht criteria the budget deficit 
must be below 3% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the debt of a 
Member State should not exceed 60% of its GDP.7 Pursuant to Article 126 (5) 
TFEU the Commission will take action if an excessive deficit occurs in a Member 
State and inform the Council. According to sections 6 and 7 the Council will ad-
dress recommendations at the Member State having an excessive deficit. If the 
Member State persists in failing to meet the Maastricht criteria, the Council may 
give notice to that Member State to remedy the problems as soon as possible. 
What is more important, is that on the basis of Article 126 (11) TFEU the Coun-
cil has the authority to require the Member State concerned to make a non-
interest-bearing deposit or to impose on this Member State a fine. Section 13 
of this provision sets out that such a decision will be taken by a qualified major-
ity and the Member State having the excessive deficit does not have the right 
to vote.  
Article 126 TFEU is worked out in the six-pack. Regulation 1466/97, as 
amended by Regulation 1175/2011, introduces the so-called European Se-
mester, which applies for both euro and non-euro Member States. This is the 
preventive part of the SGP. In the European semester general guidelines for 
the economic state of affairs in the EU are drafted. On their turn the Member 
States should draw-up budget plans for the purposes of their own economic 
governance policies. These budget plans are referred to as Stability pro-
grammes for the euro-countries and as convergence programmes for the non-
euro countries. The programmes must meet the criteria of the SGP, i.e., the 
Maastricht criteria. As already was stated, according to these criteria the gov-
ernment deficit should not exceed 3%. However, the six-pack has added a 
balanced budget-rule as a medium-term budgetary objective to the SGP. This 
                                         
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ 2011 L306/12; 
Regulation 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention 
and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJ 2011 L306/25; Regulation 
1177/2011 of the Council amending Regulation on speeding up and clarifying the im-
plementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ 2011 L306/33 and Directive 
2011/85 of the Council on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member 
States, OJ 2011 L306/41. 
7  See Article 1 of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure, OJ 2010 C83/279. This 
protocol is annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon. See also Article 1 of the Protocol on the ex-
cessive deficit procedure, OJ 1992 C224/120, which was annexed to the Treaty of 
Maastricht. 
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rule is defined as -1% of the GDP. So, the new SGP has made the deficit crite-
rion stricter by requiring a balanced budget in the medium-term run. Further-
more, according to the six-pack measures the public debt is not allowed to ex-
ceed 60% of the GDP. In exceptional circumstances Member States may dero-
gate from the six-pack requirements. As such an exceptional circumstance is 
defined 1) an unusual event outside the control of the Member State and with a 
major impact on its public finances or 2) a severe economic downturn is.8 
As currently virtually no Member State meets all Maastricht criteria, every 
national plan should set out how the ambitious goals of the SGP will be 
achieved in the near future. The national plans will be assessed at EU level. At 
first the Commission sends a draft recommendation to the Council. On the basis 
of this draft the Council will adopt its recommendation directed at a particular 
Member State. 
Regulation 1467/97, as amended by Regulation 1177/2011, comes into 
play when a Member State runs an excessive deficit. It would be beyond the 
scope of this paper to discuss all steps that must be taken for imposing a sanc-
tion upon a Member States in violation of the SGP rules. It is however clear 
from the outset that infringing the recommendations of the Council could have 
serious effects. The various regulations introduced by the six-pack measures in 
the aftermath of the current sovereign debt crisis list various penalties. For the 
euro-countries a special procedure is introduced, which can lead to ‘semi-
automatic sanctions’: if the Commission proposes a sanction and a qualified 
majority is not opposed to this proposal (reverse voting procedure) it is as-
sumed that the Council has decided to impose a penalty upon the Member 
State in violation.9 In general, it could be argued that the enforcement of the 
SGP rules is improved. Nonetheless, the plan to impose a penalty upon a 
Member States with excessive deficits will still meet with strong resistance, 
given the political sensitiveness surrounding such deficits and the possibility to 
invoke the exception of the unusual event or the economic downturn.10 
Another important set of rules introduced by the six-pack concerns the 
macro-economic imbalances. Regulation 1176/2011 gives the Commission and 
the Council the authority to take action, if a particular Member States is ex-
periencing such an imbalance. The Council could adopt a recommendation forc-
ing a Member State to address the economic problems identified in this rec-
ommendation. If a Member State fails to comply with the instructions it risks the 
imposition of a penalty. Also for macro-economic imbalances the penalty is 
semi-automatic: the proposal of the Commission is followed, unless a qualified 
majority of the Member States votes against it. 
                                         
8  See e.g. Article 2 (1) of Regulation 1467/97. 
9  See Article 6 of Regulation 1173/2011. 
10  See D. Adamski, National Power Games and Structural Failures in the European Macroe-
conomic Governance, Common Market Law Review 2012, p. 1345-1348. 
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It is striking that the role of the European Parliament is very limited in the 
procedure leading to the adoption of recommendations and the imposition of 
penalties.11 The six-pack measures only provide for an economic dialogue be-
tween the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission.12 In this dia-
logue important documents, such as the recommendations directed at Member 
States, could be discussed. However, this dialogue does not give the European 
Parliament a real opportunity to give feed back into the process and, there-
fore, it is a weak accountability.13 
The economic governance introduced by the six-pack measures is rein-
forced by the TSCG. It should be noted that two Member States, the UK and 
the Czech Republic, have decided not to sign this Treaty. Some of the conditions 
laid down in this Treaty repeat what is already stipulated in the six-pack. For 
example, according to Article 4 of the TSCG the public debt of a Member 
States should not exceed 60% of GDP. The balanced-budget rule is, however, 
made stricter than in the six-pack: (in principle) the medium-term objective of a 
Member State should be below -0.5% of GDP pursuant Article 3 (1 under b) 
TSCG. Nevertheless, a deficit of 1% of GDP could be permitted, provided that 
public debt is below 60% of GDP and the ‘…risks in terms of long-term sus-
tainability are low…’.14 Article 3 (2) TSCG requires that the balanced budget 
rule will be transposed into national provisions of binding force and permanent 
character, preferably in the constitution of the Member State concerned. As the 
drafting of this provision allows for derogation from the obligation of imple-
mentation in the national constitution, it is doubtful to what extent Member 
States will adopt national measures of overriding binding force.15 Furthermore, 
Article 3 (1 under e) TSCG imposes on the Member States the obligation to 
introduce an ‘automatic correction mechanism’, which will be triggered in the 
event of an excessive deficit. Also the TSCG confers powers upon the Commis-
sion to monitor compliance with the provisions of this treaty. The CJEU has even 
the authority to impose a financial sanction according to Article 8 TSCG. This 
authority is an important novelty with regard to the economic governance of 
the SGP, as in the past the competences of the CJEU were limited in EMU mat-
ters.16 As the TSCG is a Treaty concluded outside the framework of the TEU 
                                         
11  See M. Ruffert, The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law, Common Market Law 
Review 2011, p. 1801. 
12  See e.g. Article 2-ab of Regulation 1466/97, article 2a of Regulation 1467/97 and 
Article 14 of Regulation 1176/2011. 
13  See D. Chalmers, The European Redistributive State and a European Law of Struggle, 
European Law Journal 2012, p. 692. 
14  See Article 3 (1 under d) TSCG. 
15  See P. Graig, The Stability and Governance Treaty: principle, politics and pragmatism, 
European Law Review 2012, p. 236 and 237. 
16  See F. Amtenbrink, Legal Developments, Journal of Common Market Studies 2012, 
p. 144. 
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and TFEU, a lot of significant issues of institutional nature can be raised. How-
ever, it would beyond the scope of this paper to address them.17 
From the analysis carried out above, it is apparent that the recommenda-
tions directed at the Member States concern serious matters. Therefore, it is 
important to examine which policy areas are covered in these guidelines. 
2.2  The Country-specific Recommendations issued in 2012 
The country specific guidelines are based on the Annual Growth Survey, which 
outlines the general state of economic affairs in the EU. The 2011 Survey inter 
alia stressed the need to reform the labour markets.18 In this regard it should 
be noted that according to the Euro Plus Pact the unit labour costs in relation to 
productivity will be monitored.19 Furthermore, it was argued that pension 
schemes should be reformed in order to make them more sustainable.20 The 
2012 Survey pointed to the need to take austerity measures in order to ensure 
the sustainability of the public budgets over time.21 Furthermore, it argued that 
growth-friendly expenditure on, for example, education, research & innovation 
and energy should be prioritised.22 Also the reform of the pension systems 
should be high on the agenda.23 Furthermore, the administrative systems of the 
EU and its Member States are discussed.24 
These Annual Growth Surveys have resulted in country-specific recommen-
dations. First, the country-specific recommendations issued on the basis of the 
stability programmes submitted by the euro Member States, will be discussed. 
Subsequently, attention will be paid to the recommendations issued in relation 
to the convergence programmes, which are submitted by the non-euro Member 
States. I confine myself to the recommendations of 2012, as these recommen-
dations are the most recent ones. 
2.2.1 The recommendations directed at the euro Member States 
The recommendations directed at all euro-countries will be discussed below. 
The recommendations are based on the plans submitted by the countries them-
selves to the Council. 
 
                                         
17  On these issues, see, for example, P. Graig, op.cit., p. 238 et seq. 
18  See Annual Growth Survey: advancing the EU’s comprehensive response to the crisis, 
COM(2011) 11 final, p. 5 et seq. 
19  See the Conclusions of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area of 11 March 
2011, p. 7, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/press-
data/en/ec/119809.pdf. 
20  See Annual Growth Survey: advancing the EU’s comprehensive response to the crisis, 
COM(2011) 11 final, p. 6. 
21  See Annual Growth Survey 2012, COM(2011) 815 final, p. 4-6. 
22  See See Annual Growth Survey 2012, COM(2011) 815 final, p. 4. 
23  See previous note. 
24  See Annual Growth Survey 2012, COM(2011) 815 final, p. 12-14. 
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Austria 
In its recommendation of 10 July 201225 the Council argues that Austria is on 
the path to more sustainable public finances, but criticises this country for not 
having made effective agreements with regional and local authorities on their 
fiscal relations.26 In its recommendation the Council does not only discuss the 
level of public spending, but it also raises issues related to the national welfare 
state. Austria is criticised for not having raised the effective retirement age 
substantially.27 Furthermore, the Council is concerned about the competiveness 
of the services sector in Austria.28 One of the problems is the distortive behav-
iour of incumbent firms and the lack of progress made in opening-up liberal 
professions. It is even argued that the number of regulated professions is too 
high and that unjustified restrictions persist. Another problem is that no tangible 
progress is made on strengthening the position of the federal competition au-
thority. Furthermore Austria is requested to restructure its financial sector, as its 
banks are exposed to huge risks.29 One of the recommendations directed at 
Austria is to improve the organisation, financing and efficiency of health care 
and education.30 Also of interest is the recommendation to stimulate further 
competition in the services sector.31 
 
Belgium 
The recommendation of the Council directed at Belgium starts with stressing the 
importance of the public debt level of this Member State (which is around 98% 
of its GDP).32 Apart from this financial problem, the weak competition system 
of many industries, most notably the retail sector and the network sector, is 
criticised.33 One of the problems of the network sectors is the strong position of 
the incumbents, while it remains unclear whether the Belgian competition author-
ity will be sufficiently independent and have adequate sources despite the re-
cent reform this authority has undergone. On top of that Belgium is recom-
mended to reduce its expenditure on statutory pensions and health care 
schemes by, inter alia, rising the age of retirement.34 
                                         
25  Council Recommendation of 10 July 201 on the National Reform Programme 2012 of 
Austria and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of Austria, 2011-
2016, OJ 2012 C219/1. 
26  See para. 11 of the 2012 Recommendation issued at Austria. 
27  See para. 12 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Austria. 
28  See para. 14 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Austria.  
29  See para. 15 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Austria. 
30  See recommendation 2 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Austria. 
31  See recommendation 6 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Austria. 
32  See para. 10 of the Council Recommendation of 10 July 201 on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Belgium delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of 
Belgium, 2012-15, OJ 2012 C219/5. 
33  See para. 15 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Belgium. 
34  See recommendation 2 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Belgium. 
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Cyprus 
The Council is of the opinion that Cyprus is on the right track in reducing its pub-
lic debt, but given the wide exposure of its banking institutions to the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis, this country is facing considerable risks.35 The Council ex-
presses its regret that Cyprus has not addressed the inequality and inefficien-
cies in the health care sector.36 Furthermore, Cyprus is encouraged to change is 
wage system37 and to remove obstacles to free trade in various services sec-
tors38 in order to boost its competiveness. Another important issue is rising the 
age of retirement.39 
 
Estonia 
Estonia has a sizeable budget surplus in 2011 and considers plans in order to 
control the efficiency of public spending (by means of the introduction of a 
structural budget rule).40 The Council recommends Estonia to reform the labour 
market by introducing incentives for low- and high-income earners receiving 
unemployment and parental benefits to take-up work again.41 Strikingly, the 
Council urges Estonia to ensure the financial stability of the local authorities in 
order improve the provision of public services.42 The Council expresses its con-
cern about the difficulties these authorities encounter in universally delivering 
the necessary social, health, labour market, transport and educational ser-
vices.43 
 
Finland 
The situation of public finances is in line with the GDP standards in Finland, but 
in the long run the sustainability of the these finances can be put under pressure 
due to the rapidly ageing of the population.44 The Council contends that the 
productivity of public services has been in decline over the past decade in 
Finland and, therefore, it encourages this Member State to introduce more 
                                         
35  See paras. 10 and 12 of the Council Recommendation of 10 July 201 on the National 
Reform Programme 2012 of Cyprus and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability 
Programme of Cyprus 2012-2014, OJ 2012 C219/13. 
36  See para. 14 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Cyprus. 
37  See para. 15 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Cyprus. 
38  See para. 16 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Cyprus. 
39  See recommendation 3 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Cyprus. 
40  See para. 11 of the Recommendation of 10 July 201 on the National Reform Pro-
gramme 2012 of Estonia and delivering a Council Opinion on the Stability Programme 
of Estonia, 2012-15, OJ 2012 C219/25.  
41  See para. 12 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Estonia. 
42  See para. 15 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Estonia. 
43  See previous note. 
44  See para. 10 of the Recommendation of 10 July 201 on the National Reform Pro-
gramme 2012 of Finland and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of 
Finland, 2012-2015, OJ 2012 C219/28. 
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competition in shielded private and public service sectors.45 Furthermore, the 
Council points to restrictive regulatory barriers in the services sector, the high 
market concentration in many sectors and the low level of the competition law 
fines.46 
 
France 
The Council argues that France should specify the measures to be taken in or-
der to reduce its excessive deficit.47 The Council argues that as regards the 
increase of the age of retirement France has failed to take sufficient meas-
ures.48 Also, the Council opines that the measures taken by France in order to 
simply business environment has fallen short and more barriers to entry with 
regard to, for example, regulated professions have to be removed.49 On top 
of that, the intensity of competition in the network sectors should be rein-
forced.50 France is also advised to introduce a more simple and balanced 
taxation system, which shifts the tax burden from labour to other forms of taxa-
tion that weigh less on growth and competiveness.51 
 
Germany 
Germany’s deficit was 1 % in 2013 and close to 0,5 % in the years to come, 
while its debt will be on a downwards path as from 2013.52 Despite this excel-
lent track record, the Council expresses its concern about the future costs in-
creases in health care.53 Therefore, Germany is advised to improve the effi-
ciency of its health care sector, which is necessary in order to contain expected 
further expenditure increases.54 On top of that the Council tells Germany to 
ensure effective spending by regional authorities in the areas of education and 
research.55 Also Germany is advised to remove fiscal disincentives for low-
income earners and second earners in order to stimulate them to return to the 
labour market.56  
                                         
45  See para. 11 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Finland. 
46  See para. 13 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Finland. 
47  See para. 10 of the Recommendation of 10 July 201 on the National Reform Pro-
gramme 2012 of France and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of 
France, 2012-2016, OJ 2012 OJ219/31. 
48  See para. 13 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at France. 
49  See para. 17 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at France. 
50  See para. 18 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at France. 
51  See recommendation 3 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at France. 
52  See para. 11 of the Recommendation of 10 July 201 on the National Reform Pro-
gramme 2012 of Germany and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme 
of Germany, 2012-2016, OJ 2012 C219/35. 
53  See para. 12 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Germany. 
54  See previous note. 
55  See previous note. 
56  See recommendation 4 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Germany. 
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Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
It is clear that Greece, Ireland and Portugal are in deep financial problems. 
Money was lent to these countries through various mechanisms, such as the 
European Financial Stability Facility and the IMF, on the condition that ambi-
tious, structural, financial and economic reforms were carried out. It is not a sur-
prise that in its 2012 Recommendations the Council mainly confines itself to re-
ferring to the measures already adopted and to recommending implementing 
all these measures.57 
 
Italy 
Although the debt of Italy is very high, this Member State expects to have re-
duced the general government deficit below 3% by 2012.58 Nevertheless, a 
lot of work must still be done. Tax compliance and governance must be im-
proved.59 As for the labour market, the wage-bargaining system must be im-
proved as to allow for more flexible arrangements.60 On top of that, the high 
youth unemployment should be addressed.61 Italy is praised for the progress it 
has made in liberalising various services markets (such as the sector of profes-
sional services) but it is stressed that bottlenecks, especially in the energy and 
transport sectors, must be solved.62 Moreover, administrative simplification and 
the improvement of the judicial system are needed, since the business environ-
ment is complex in Italy.63 
 
Luxembourg 
The government deficit and the public debt of Luxembourg are at a very low 
level. Nevertheless, the Council advises this Member State to implement rigor-
ously its own budgetary strategy, as due to the ageing of the population public 
                                         
57  See the Council Recommendation of 10 July 2012 on the National Reform Programme 
2012 Greece, OJ 219/38; the Council Recommendation of 10 July 2012 on t he Na-
tional Reform Programme 2012 of Ireland and delivering a Council opinion on the Sta-
bility Programme of Ireland, 2012-2015, OJ 2012 C219/44 and the Council Recom-
mendation of 10 July 2012 on the National Reform Programme 2012 of Portugal and 
delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of Portugal, 2012-16, OJ 2012 
C-219/69. 
58  See para. 10 of the Council Recommendation of 10 July 2012 on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Italy and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme 
of Italy, 2012-2015, OJ 2012 C219/46. 
59  See para. 12 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Italy. 
60  See para. 13 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Italy. 
61  See para. 15 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Italy. 
62  See para. 17 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Italy. 
63  See para. 18 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Italy. 
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spending on pensions will raise.64 The Council criticises the pension reforms 
adopted by the government of Luxembourg,65 as these reforms have only had 
limited effect on the effective age of retirement. Furthermore, the Council ar-
gues that Luxembourg should take action in order to solve the problem of high 
youth unemployment.66 
 
Malta 
Although the deficit of Malta is not high, the Council advises Malta to take ap-
propriate measures, as government expenditure could rise due to some eco-
nomic problems.67 In the view of the Council it is important that Malta develops 
a comprehensive active-ageing strategy.68 Furthermore, given the mismatch 
between demand and supply of skills on the market the Council recommends 
Malta to improve its education system and labour market.69  
 
The Netherlands 
The Council states that the measures taken by The Netherlands will bring down 
the government deficit to below 3%.70 However, the Council also notes that no 
measures for reducing the public debt are specified.71 The plans of the Dutch 
government to rise the statutory age of retirement to 67 (in 2024) is welcomed 
by the Council. Furthermore, in order to improve the functioning of the labour 
market The Netherlands should reduce the fiscal disincentives for second-
income earners.72 Furthermore, the Council recommends the Dutch government 
to address the distortions on the housing markets by modifying the favourable 
tax treatment of home ownership, by introducing a more market-oriented pric-
ing system for the rental market and, for social housing, by aligning rents with 
household income.73 
 
                                         
64  See para. 10 of the Recommendation of 10 July 201 on the National Reform Pro-
gramme 2012 of Luxembourg and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Pro-
gramme of Luxembourg, 2012-2015, OJ 2012 C219/58. 
65  See para. 11 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Luxembourg. 
66  See para. 13 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Luxembourg. 
67  See para. 10 of the Recommendation of 10 July 201 on the National Reform Pro-
gramme 2012 of Malta and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of 
Malta, 2012-2015, OJ 2012 C219/61. 
68  See para. 11 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Malta. 
69  See para. 12 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Malta. 
70  See para. 10 the Recommendation of 10 July 201 on the National Reform Programme 
2012 of The Netherlands and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of 
The Netherlands, 2012-2015, OJ 2012 C219/88. 
71  See previous note. 
72  See para. 12 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at The Netherlands. 
73  See recommendation 5 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at The Netherlands. 
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Slovakia 
The Council asks Slovakia to take additional measures in order to correct the 
excessive deficit.74 In the view of the Council Slovakia has not undertaken suffi-
cient action to make its public finances sustainable. It is of great importance to 
reform the pension system.75 Slovakia is criticised for its lack of action regard-
ing the limited participation of older workers and women in the labour mar-
ket.76 Furthermore, it is argued that the overall quality and capacity of the 
public institutions remain weak.77 Therefore, the quality of the public service 
should be strengthened.78 
 
Slovenia 
The Council notes that Slovenia has committed itself to bring the government 
deficit below 3%, which is in line with the rules of the SGP; however, it ex-
presses also its concern that the targets set could not be achieved due to the 
lack of specification of the measures to be taken and the economic problems, 
such as the possible additional capital support operations that some Slovenian 
banks may need.79 It is also argued that Slovenia should rise the effective age 
of retirement and to increase the employment rate of older workers.80 Given 
the weak position of Slovenian banks the government is urged to take the re-
quired steps in order to ensure that sufficient capital buffers are built.81 Fur-
thermore, it is necessary to adjust employment protection legislation with re-
gard to permanent contracts in order to reduce labour market segmentation.82 
Moreover, Slovenia should ensure, by co-operating with the social partners, 
that wage growth supports competiveness.83 It may be assumed that this means 
that the government should prevent wage from rising (too much). On top of that 
the Council recommends Slovenia to open-up markets, especially those of pro-
fessional services, and to improve the business environment by, inter alia, re-
forming its national competition authority.84 
 
                                         
74  See recommendation 1 of the Recommendation of 10 July 201 on the National Reform 
Programme 2012 of Slovakia and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Pro-
gramme of Slovakia, 2012-2015, OJ 2012 C219/74. 
75  See para. 12 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Slovakia. 
76  See para. 13 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Slovakia. 
77  See para. 16 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Slovakia. 
78  See recommendation 7 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Slovakia. 
79  See para. 10 of the Recommendation of 10 July 201 on the National Reform Pro-
gramme 2012 of Slovenia and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme 
of Slovenia, 2012-2015, OJ 2012 C219/747. 
80  See para. 11 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Slovenia. 
81  See recommendation 3 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Slovenia. 
82  See recommendation 4 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Slovenia. 
83  See recommendation 7 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Slovenia. 
84  See recommendation 6 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Slovenia. 
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Spain 
The last years Spain was confronted with deep financial problems. It is there-
fore not a surprise that the Council is of the opinion that Spain should reduce its 
government deficit (below 3%) and its public debt (below 60% of its GDP).85 
Spain should adopt and implement the multi-annual budget plan for 2013-
2014 and ensure that obligations imposed by this plan are also observed by 
its regional authorities.86 Furthermore, Spain should implement its pension re-
form plans and ensure that the retirement age is rising in line with life expec-
tancy.87 Given the economic problems Spain is encouraged to ensure the sus-
tainability of its banks and other financial institutions despite the fact that it has 
already made much progress in this regard.88 Spain is urged to implement 
measures to tackle its high youth unemployment without delay.89 A concern ex-
pressed by the Council is that professional services remain protected from 
competition in Spain and, therefore, the provision of these services should be 
reformed, which could increase the potential GDP.90  
2.2.2 The Recommendations directed at non-euro Member States  
Below a few recommendations directed at non-euro Member States will be 
discussed. Due to space restraints, only three non-euro countries will be included 
in the analysis. The countries selected are Hungary, Sweden and the UK. This 
selection will lead to a representative assessment given the different features 
of the countries concerned: Hungary is confronted with serious financial prob-
lems, the performance of Sweden is on a considerable high level despite the 
current economic downturn and the UK is one of the largest economies in the 
EU. The recommendations discussed below are based on the convergence pro-
grammes submitted by the Member States concerned. 
 
Hungary 
The Council is concerned that the plans proposed by the Hungarian government 
are not specific enough to reduce the government deficit and, therefore, it ad-
vises to specify the structural measures and not to rely too heavily on one-off 
measures.91 Furthermore, the macroeconomic imbalances should be mitigated 
                                         
85  See para. 10 of the Recommendation of 10 July 201 on the National Reform Pro-
gramme 2012 of Spain and delivering a Council opinion on the Stability Programme of 
Spain, 2012-2015, OJ 2012 C219/81. 
86  See recommendation 1 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Spain. 
87  See recommendation 2 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Spain. 
88  See para. 13 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Spain. 
89  See para. 15 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Spain. 
90  See para. 17 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Spain. 
91  See recommendation 1 of the Council Recommendation of 10 July 2012 on the National 
Reform Programme 2012 of Hungary and delivering a Council opinion on the Conver-
gence Programme of Hungary, 2012-2015, OJ2012 C219/40. 
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and the pubic debt ratio should be brought on a firm downward path.92 Fur-
thermore, Hungary is criticized for not having adopted effective measures for 
encouraging low wage earners and women to participate in the labour mar-
ket.93 Despite the progress made, Hungary is urged to improve its business en-
vironment and to take action with regard to its public administration, which 
ranks very low on many indicators of transparency and quality.94 It should im-
plement measures to reduce the administrative burden and it has to ensure that 
public procurement and the legislative process support market competition and 
a business-friendly environment for enterprises.95 On top of that, it is contended 
that Hungary should make its public transport system more efficient and it has 
to increase the cross-border capacity of its electricity network. 
 
Sweden 
The deficit of Sweden is below 3 % and its debt ratio is not in excess of 60% 
of the GDP, and, therefore, Sweden is encouraged to preserve its sound fiscal 
policies.96 Nevertheless, some potential problems are identified: Sweden is 
warned for the volatility of its housing market due to generous tax facility for 
ownership, whereas also a stringent rent regulation is in place.97 The rather 
high level of household debt, resulting from this situation, needs attention. An-
other problem that Sweden should address is the low level of labour market 
participation of young workers and vulnerable groups.98 
 
United Kingdom 
As the government deficit of the UK is estimated at 4,4% in 2014-15 and its 
public debt will be at 94,7% of GDP around that time, this country is urged to 
take action in order to make public finance more sustainable.99 Furthermore, 
the UK should address the high and volatile house prices and the high house-
hold debt by, inter alia, increasing house supply.100 The Council expresses its 
concerns about the high rate of unemployment, especially with regard to young 
                                         
92  See previous note. 
93  See para. 13 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Hungary. 
94  See para. 15 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Hungary. 
95  See recommendation 5 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Hungary. 
96  See para. 9 and recommendation 1 of the Council Recommendation of 10 July 2012 on 
the National Reform Programme 2012 of Sweden and delivering a Council opinion on 
the Convergence Programme of Sweden, 2012-2015, OJ2012 C219/85. 
97  See para. 10 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Sweden. 
98  See para. 11 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at Sweden.  
99  See para. 10 and recommendation 1 of the Council Recommendation of 10 July 2012 
on the National Reform Programme 2012 of United Kingdom and delivering a Council 
opinion on the Convergence Programme of United Kingdom, 2012-2017, OJ2012 
C219/91. 
100 See recommendation 2 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at the UK. 
Nijmegen State and Law Research Papers Series 2012/01 
 
 
 
workers.101 Therefore, the employability of most notably young people has to 
be increased.102 Another serious concern is related to child poverty: as the 
number of pour children rise, the UK should implement measures that facilitate 
access to childcare services.103 On top of that, the UK should improve its energy 
and transport infrastructure in order to give a boost to the competiveness of its 
economy.104 
2.2.3 Evaluation 
It is clear from the analysis of the Council’s recommendations that not only issues 
of sound public finance policy are addressed, but also other subjects. Many of 
the issues covered by the guidelines concern matters of the social welfare state. 
Statutory pension schemes are often included in the recommendations and, 
mostly, it is argued that the effective age of retirement should be raised. Fur-
thermore, housing, educational matters and social services, such as childcare, 
play a role in the Council’s analysis as well. 
Two things catch the eye more in particular. In the first place, Member 
States are stimulated to introduce competition in schemes of the social welfare 
state in order to enhance the efficiency of the provision of the services con-
cerned. So, competition is a key value that Member States should respect, also 
in matters concerning the social welfare state. In the second place, from time to 
time the Council criticises the level of the provision of particular welfare ser-
vices. In other words, the Council applies a particular benchmark for the mini-
mum level of quality and cover with regard to these services. What this level 
exactly entails, is not specified by the Council, but by criticising some Member 
States for not solving a particular social problem, it, at least, suggests that a EU 
approach to such a minimum level is being developed.  
Apart from the social welfare state, it is clear that the Council also assigns 
great value to the public institutions of the Member States. The success of the 
economy and, therefore, the effectiveness of the measures for reducing the 
government deficit and the public debt are depending on the functioning of 
important public institutions such as the judiciary and authorities responsible for 
the (smooth) issuing of authorisations. The analysis of the recommendation shows 
that the Council relates the functioning of these institutions to the economic and 
financial performance of a particular Member State. The Council does also not 
shy away from giving instructions on how a Member State should organise its 
public institutions. 
                                         
101 See para. 12 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at the UK. 
102 See recommendation 3 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at the UK. 
103 See recommendation 4 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at the UK. 
104 See para. 15 of the 2012 Recommendation directed at the UK. 
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In other words, important non-economic values are analysed and assessed 
in the light of economic assessments. The reason for intervening in these matters 
lies in ensuring the sustainability of the public finances of the Member States. In 
other words, the SGP has added an economic dimension to many policy areas, 
which are used to be governed by non-economic principles. 
These findings should not come as a surprise. The SGP rules are reinforced 
and competiveness is one of the values that are at the heart of the six-pack 
measures. The drafting of these rules authorises the Council to develop an inte-
grated and comprehensive approach to economic and non-economic matters, 
which are binding upon the Member States. 
Below, it will be examined to what extent the classical areas of European 
economic law, i.e. free movement and competition law, allow for integrating 
economic areas with social welfare state matters. 
3.  EU INTERNAL MARKET LAW AND ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE 
Establishing an EU internal market is one of the major objectives of the EU.105 
When it comes to economic governance in the EU, the role of the EU Internal 
Market is of great importance. The EU rules on the internal market should be 
divided into two categories: The Treaty provisions on free movement and the 
harmonisation measures adopted by the European legislature. Therefore, both 
these areas of EU law will be discussed below. 
3.1 The evolving rules for free movement in the EU  
The Treaty provisions on free movement are interpreted in an expansive way 
by the CJEU. Every restriction that could render market access more difficult is 
prohibited.106 In the past, the case law on e.g. the free movement of services 
started with forbidding discriminatory measures,107 but later the CJEU has ex-
tended its interpretation of the free movements prohibitions to every national 
measure restricting market access108 and has also brought sensitive national 
                                         
105 See Art. 3 (3) TEU and Art. 26 TFEU. 
106 See, e.g., C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2010, p. 116, 354, 355, 416 and 600. Important landmark cases are Case 120/78, 
Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 
649; C-76/90, Manfred Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd [1991] ECR I-4221; Case C-
384/93, Alpine Investments BV v Ministerie van Financiën [1995] I-1141 and Case C-
55/94, Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] I-
4165 and case C-302/97, Klaus Konle vs Republic Austria [1999] I-3099. 
107 See e.g, Case 2/74, Jean Reyners v. Belgium [1974] ECR 631. 
108 See, for example, Case C-76/90, Manfred Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd [1991] ECR I-
4221; case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v. Ministerie van Financiën [1995] ECR I-
1141 and case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di 
Milano [1995] ECR I-4165. 
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policy areas, such as health care,109 within the ambit of the Treaty provisions on 
free movement.110 Accordingly, many restrictions to services markets should be 
removed. As was apparent from the analysis of the six-pack rules, the social 
welfare states are also subject to scrutiny in the SGP. It is remarkable that na-
tional social security systems are not immune from the free movement rules as 
well. In cases such as Freskot111 and Kattner Stahlbau,112 the CJEU held that if a 
social security scheme concerns insurable risks, it should be assessed whether 
the national rules for these systems restrict free movement. In this regard, it 
should be noted that as a rule national social security systems are based on 
compulsory affiliation, and therefore, they have restrictive effects on the tree 
trade in, for example, services. It should be noted that if an insurance scheme 
does not concern insurable risks, EU free movement law does not apply and 
that, as a result, compulsory affiliation to these kinds of schemes do not lead to 
free movement issues. In general, it may be assumed that many statutory 
schemes escape from the free movement rules, as such schemes do not normally 
amount to interesting business cases for commercial operators, whereas sup-
plementary schemes are likely to be subject to these rules, since a commercial 
enterprise may be interested in providing the cover of the risks concerned.  
However, exceptions can be invoked in order to justify particular restric-
tions. These exceptions come down to the protection of policies of general in-
terest, as acknowledged in the Treaty113 or developed in the case law (over-
riding requirements of general interest).114 In cases concerning social security 
schemes, the CJEU has acknowledged that objectives closely related to the so-
cial welfare state, such as social policy115 and the financial equilibrium of social 
security schemes,116 are interests accommodated in these exceptions. Neverthe-
less, only national measures that are proportionate are justifiable. As a result, 
the CJEU examined in some cases whether compulsory affiliation only con-
                                         
109 See e.g. Case C-158/96, Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-120/95, Decker [1998] ECR 
I-1831; Case C-157/99, Smits en Peerbooms ECR [2001] I-5473; Case C-385/99, 
Müller-Fauré ECR, [2003] I-4509 and Case C-372/04, Watts ECR [2006] I-4325. 
110 On this development, see J.W. van de Gronden, The freedom to provide services, in: S.E. 
Gaines, B. Egelund Olsen & K. Engsig Sørensen, Liberalising Trade in the EU and the WTO, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012, p.235-240. 
111 Case C-355/00, Freskot AE v. Elliniko Dimosio [2003] ECR I-5263. 
112 Case C-350/07, Kattner Stahlbau v Maschinenbau- und Metall- Berufsgenossenschaft 
[2009] ECR I-1513. 
113 See, e.g., Article 36 TFEU and Article 52 TFEU. 
114 In Cassis de Dijon (already mentioned) the CJEU accepted for the first time that these 
requirements (which were then referred to as ‘mandatory requirements’) were capable 
of justifying restrictions of free movement. In legal doctrine this exception is known as the 
Rule of Reason. 
115 See, for example, Freskot. 
116 See, e.g., Case C-158/96, Kohll [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-120/95, Decker [1998] 
ECR I-1831; Case C-157/99, Smits en Peerbooms, ECR [2001] I-5473; Case C-385/99, 
Müller-Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509 and Case C-372/04, Watts, ECR [2006] I-4325. 
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cerned essential services, or whether compulsory affiliation also encompassed 
additional services, which could be disconnected from the essential social wel-
fare services at issue.117 If the latter was the case, the principle of proportion-
ality was not met and, as a result, EU free movement law was infringed. So, if 
a scheme provides for the cover of risks that are not necessary for the per-
formance of the social task assigned to a body managing the scheme con-
cerned, the Treaty provisions on free movement are violated. In other words, 
market considerations play an important role in this assessment. If possible, the 
provision of a social service should be left to market forces. 
Then again, it is clear from the outset that such a test is hard to apply. As a 
result, the CJEU is inclined to allow the Member States a wide margin of ap-
preciation in sensitive areas such as the social welfare states.118 Increasingly, in 
these areas the CJEU examines whether the national measures are drafted in a 
systematic and consistent way.119 If this is the case, the CJEU is likely to decide 
that the proportionality principle is observed. Consequently, the design of na-
tional measure is of great importance. If these measures respect good govern-
ance-type principles, they are more likely to pass the proportionality test than 
if they do not do so. The principles of transparency120 and fundamental 
rights121 are applied in such cases by the CJEU. 
This analysis shows that the free movement rules that aim at removing ob-
stacles to free trade have also an impact on the social welfare state, as social 
security systems could fall within the scope of these rules. This finding is in line 
with the analysis of the SGP. However, EU free movement law is not allowed to 
cross the line of non-insurable activities. Risks that cannot be insured fall outside 
the scope of the Treaty provisions on free movement. In other words, only in so 
far as social security schemes have an economic dimension, they are subject to 
free movement scrutiny. This is a great difference with the SGP rules, as the 
                                         
117 See para. 89 of Kattner Stahlbau. 
118 See, e.g., Joined Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07, José Manuel Blanco Pérez a.o. v. Con-
sejerá de Salud y Servicios Sanitarios and Principado de Asturias, 1 June 2010, n.y.r.; 
Case C-512/08, Commission v. French Republic, 5 October 2010, n.y.r.; Case C-46/08, 
Carmen Media Group Ltd v. Land Schleswig-Holstein, Innenminister des Landes Schleswig-
Holstein, 8 September 2010, n.y.r. and Case C-89/09, Commission v. French Republic, 16 
December 2010, n.y.r. 
119 See, for example, Case C-169/07, Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Wiener Landes-
regierung and Oberösterreichische Landesregierung [2009] ECR I-1721. 
120 See, for example, Case C-231/03, Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v. Comune di 
Cingia de’ Botti [2005] ECR I-7287 and Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH, Tele-
fonadress GmbH v. Telekom Austria AG [2000] ECR I-10745. On this case law see, e.g., 
B.J. Drijber & H. Stergiou, Public Procurement law and Internal Market law, Common 
Market Law Review 46 (2009), pp. 815-821. 
121 See, e.g., Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v. Ober-
bürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609 and Case C-112/00, Eugen 
Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-
5659. 
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application of these rules does not depend on the character of the national 
scheme concerned. 
Then again, some interesting similarities between the SGP rules and free 
movement law should be pointed out. As was outlined above, EU free move-
ment law forces Member State to make a distinction between social welfare 
services that can be left to the market and those that should be made subject to 
State control. Also, the SGP rules are interpreted as to encompass a duty for 
Member States to introduce competition in social welfare schemes, if possible.  
Another interesting similarity is that the application of EU free movement 
law has given rise to the development of non-economic values, such as the prin-
ciples of good governance. This finding matches with the conclusion that under 
the SGP rules attention is paid to the quality of public institutions. In conse-
quence, the application and interpretation of market-oriented rules inspire the 
EU institutions to develop non-economic values. In addition, the case law of the 
CJEU on free movement law contains a huge body of precedencies, which en-
ables the EU and its Member States to review national market interventions. 
Consequently, this case law could provide the Commission and the Council with 
guidance on how to carry out their tasks under the six-pack. More in particular, 
the experience gained in EU free movement law shows how trade-offs between 
market and non market values could be made. In which circumstances should 
priority be given to opening up a market and when should public interests pre-
vail? 
To conclude, the development of these two areas of law (the SGP and EU 
free movement law) also reveals a significant difference with regard to the 
institutional framework. EU free movement law has a longstanding tradition 
and its development is predominantly in the hands of the CJEU. The SGP rules 
are only very recently adopted and should still prove itself. In contrast, the 
Council and the Commission play a key role in the application and enforcement 
of the SGP roles, and to date the CJEU’s role remains rather unclear. 
3.2  Harmonisation and the social welfare state  
It is a well-known fact that the EU has adopted many harmonisation measures 
in order to level out the disparities resulting from the different national legal 
systems. An important aim of these EU measures is to harmonise the competition 
conditions.122 A very important example in this respect is the Services Direc-
tive.123 It is striking that in EU documents published in relation to the euro crisis 
                                         
122 P. Graig & G. de Burca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2011, p. 582. 
123 Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 on services in the internal market, OJ [2006] L 376/36. 
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the importance of the good implementation of this directive is stressed.124 It is 
clear that the full enforcement of the Services Directive will contribute consid-
erably to the competiveness of a particular country. In this regard, it is striking 
that the Euro Plus Pact states that sheltered sectors should be opened-up and 
unjustified restrictions should be removed.125 It goes without saying that en-
forcement not only means the transposition of the Services Directive in national 
acts but also applying it in practice. So, addressing the competiveness of a 
particular Member States under the six-pack rules leads to monitoring to what 
extent significant EU harmonisation measures, such as the Services Directive, are 
effectuated in the Member State concerned. In other words, if under the SGP 
rules the Council criticises national measures for restricting the provision of par-
ticular services, this is an indication that possibly a EU harmonisation measure, 
such as the Services Directive, is not complied with. As a result the Commission 
could start an investigation and consider starting an Article 258 TFEU proce-
dure. Consequently, the SGP could give a considerable boost to the enforce-
ment of EU free movement law. 
However, a very important observation must be made in this respect. It is 
apparent from the TFEU that the EU has only limited competences in harmonis-
ing the competiveness of its Member States. Article 114 TFEU vests the EU with 
powers to adopt binding legislation for the internal market, but other provisions 
of the Treaty are crystal clear about its competences in social welfare matters. 
These competences are highly limited. It is up to the Member States to develop 
policies for high employment rates (Art 145-149), to adopt binding measures 
for social policy (Articles 151-161 TFEU), to organise education (Art 165-166) 
and to organise and deliver health care (Art 168 TFEU). In cases, such as To-
bacco Advertisement,126 the CJEU has held that it is only permitted for the EU to 
take action on the basis of Article 114 TFEU, in order to remove obstacles to 
free movement or to solve appreciable distortions of competition.127 On the 
other hand, the Tobacco Advertisement case is also an extension of the Article 
114 TFEU powers of the EU, as measures that predominately pursue objectives, 
such as the protection of public health, could be based on this Treaty provision, 
as long as they address appreciable effects on the fundamental freedoms or 
                                         
124 See para. 7 of the Conclusions of the European Council of 24 and 25 March 2011, 
EUCO 10/1/11. In these conclusions the Member States are called upon to fully imple-
ment the Services Directives. 
125 See the Conclusions of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area of 11 March 
2011, p. 8. 
126 Case C-376/98, Germany v. European Parliament (Tobacco Advertisement) [2000] ECR I-
8419. 
127 See para. 84 and 106 of Germany vs European Parliament (Tobacco Advertisement). See 
also S.A. de Vries, Tensions within the Internal Market. The Functioning of the Internal Mar-
ket and the Development of Horizontal and Flanking Policies, Groningen: Europa Law Pub-
lishing 2006, p. 268. 
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competition.128 Accordingly, the CJEU has extended the authority of the EU to 
take action in internal market matters. Nevertheless, it goes without saying that 
the EU is not allowed to cross the red line drawn by the Treaty. Some Treaty 
provisions clearly prohibit the EU to harmonise particular matters. For example, 
Article 168 (7) TFEU provides that the EU must respect the Member States’ 
competences to organise and deliver health care. As the design of health care 
schemes is at the heart of organisation and delivery of care, it is not permitted 
for the EU to harmonise the national laws governing these schemes. 
In sum, apart from a few exceptions the role of the EU is limited in social 
welfare matters. Consequently, approximation of the national systems of the 
welfare states cannot be realised under the TFEU, as it stands now. It is clear 
that one of the core issues of such systems is constituted by the benefits, which 
the citizens of a Member State are entitled to. Strikingly, under the surveillance 
mechanism introduced by the six-pack rules the Commission and the Council 
express their views as on how Member States should reform their social wel-
fare states. The economic rationale for this is clear, as the level of benefits has 
a huge impact on government deficits and public debt. In term of division of 
powers, however, the measures taken under the SGP do nit sit well with the 
division of the competences between the EU’s and Member States as envisaged 
by the TFEU. The EU cannot adopt a law obliging a Member State to change 
the key features of a particular social security system. But if a Member State 
fails to reform these features and, as a result, exceeds the maximum level of 
the government deficit set by the SGP rules or worsens macroeconomic imbal-
ances, it risks being fined by the EU. The recommendations adopted under the 
SGP are not permissive, despite their misleading name. In sum, the classical 
division of powers as laid down in the TFEU is put under pressure by the eco-
nomic governance rules of the six-pack. 
4.  EU COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
It goes without saying that the Treaty provisions on competition are capable of 
improving the competiveness of the EU Member States. Compliance with these 
provisions will help Member States to make their markets and economies more 
efficient. The competition rules laid down in the Treaty prohibit undertakings 
from engaging in anti-competitive practices. It goes without saying that good 
track records in enforcing these rules considerably contribute to the competive-
ness of the EU and its Member States. The Commission plays a key role in en-
forcing the European competition rules. Furthermore, in 2004 the enforcement 
of the competition rules was decentralised. Regulation 2003/1129 obliges the 
                                         
128 See S.A. de Vries, op.cit., p. 268 and 269. 
129 Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Arti-
cles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L1/1. 
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national competition authorities to apply the European competition rules to 
business practises influencing the trade between the Member States. Conse-
quently, in the EU there is a multi-layered network composed of the Commission 
and the national competition authorities, which are responsible for the enforce-
ment of the competition rules.  
Both the Commission and the national competition authorities publish annual 
reports on the state of competition and the compliance with the competition 
rules. These reports give very valuable information on the competiveness of the 
European markets and therefore, they could be used in the supervision of the 
public budgets and the macroeconomic developments introduced by the Six-
pack. 
The point is, however, that SGP recommendations address both the func-
tioning of national markets and national welfare states. National security sys-
tems play a key role in national welfare state policies. Accordingly, it should 
be examined to what extent the competition rules apply to the social security 
systems. Therefore, below the concept of undertaking will be explored and 
then it will be discussed how the competition rules are applied to social security 
systems. 
4.1  The concept of undertaking and social security systems  
The competition rules apply in so far as the entities concerned are undertakings 
for the purposes of European competition law. It is settled case law that every 
entity engaged in an economic activity is an undertaking130 and that the offer-
ing of goods or services on the market amounts to such an economic activity.131  
Do the competition rules apply to the institutions that play a key role in social 
welfare states, i.e., the bodies managing social security schemes? It is apparent 
from cases, such as AOK132 and AG2R,133 that, as long as the principle of soli-
darity is predominant and the managing bodies of the scheme under review 
are subject to substantial State control, competition law does not apply. It may 
be assumed that solidarity is predominant when the level of benefits is fixed in 
national legislation.134 As a result, if no substantial competition elements are 
                                         
130 See for example case C-41/90, Höfner [1991] ECR I-1979. 
131 See e.g. case 118/85, Commission v. Italy [1987] ECR 2599. 
132 See Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, AOK Bundesver-
band et al. v. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes, Hermani & Co. et al. [2004] ECR I-2493. See 
also, for example, joined cases C-159/91 and C-160/91, Christian Poucet v. Assurances 
Générales de France and Caisse Mutuelle Régionale du Languedoc-Roussillon [1993] ECR I-
637 and C-355/01, AOK Bundesverband et al. v. Ichthyol-Gesellschaft Cordes, Hermani & 
Co. et al. [2004] ECR I-2493 and Case C-205/03P, FENIN v. Commission [2006] ECR I-
6295. 
133 See Case C-437/09, AG2R Prévoyance v. Beaudout Père et Fils SARL, 3 March 2011, 
n.y.r. See also Case C-350/07, Kattner Stahlbau GmbH v. Maschinen- und Metall- 
Berufsgenossenschaft [2009] ECR I-1513. 
134 See para. 52 of AOK. 
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introduced in a social security scheme, the bodies managing these schemes are 
not undertakings within the meaning of EU competition law. Accordingly, com-
petition law cannot be used in order to force Member States to make their so-
cial security schemes more competitive. It is up to the national legislature to de-
cide on the role competition plays in such schemes. As soon as the national leg-
islature decides to introduce competition with regard to the benefits, which its 
citizens are entitled to, the competition rules kick in and the effective operation 
of the scheme concerned can be assessed in the light of these rules. 
In this respect, it should be noted that recently the CJEU has slightly 
changed its approach to the concept of undertaking. In AG2R, it has clearly set 
out what this new approach entails. Apart from solidarity, the management of 
the social security scheme concerned should also be subject to substantial State 
control. If not, the managing bodies will not escape from EU competition law. 
Accordingly, as soon as a scheme is out of control of the State, the competition 
rules come into play. The CJEU has stretched-up the applicability of the Treaty 
provisions on competition. In AG2R, the CJEU contended in clear wording that 
the two requirements of solidarity and substantial State control are cumulative: 
if a scheme fails to meet one of them, the managing body is an undertaking. 
Consequently, as soon as a national legislature decides to place the manage-
ment of a social security scheme at arm’s length of the State or to allow for 
competition, the bodies managing these schemes are subjected to competition 
law. 
4.2  The competition rules and social security systems  
The applicability of EU competition law implies that bodies managing the social 
security schemes concerned should observe Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the 
EU merger control rules. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to fully 
discuss these rules. However, in comparison with the EU free movement rules the 
Treaty provisions on competition has undergone a different development. The 
last 15 years the need of an economic approach to EU competition law is fre-
quently advocated and pushed. Especially, the Commission has aligned its pol-
icy with the modern thinking on efficiency and consumer welfare.135 It is unde-
niable that a formalistic interpretation of the competition rules would lead to 
inefficient results in many cases. Nevertheless, it should be noted that now 
agreements that used to be regarded as restrictive are permitted, if they do 
not cause substantial harm to competition. This stands in contrast with the free 
movement rules, which are increasingly interpreted in an expansive way, as 
was outlined in section 3. Whereas the room for manoeuvre for the Member 
States have been narrowed down, firms now have more leeway for their com-
                                         
135 See A. Jones & B. Sufrin, EU Competition law. Text Cases and Materials, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2011, p. 45. 
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mercial policies. In relation to the SGP rules this is an interesting development. 
The free movement rules call into question national legislative acts that restrict 
market access and have adverse effects on efficiency. In general, the competi-
tion rules do not ban efficient commercial practices. As efficiency is also a gen-
eral concern in the SGP recommendations, it is safe to conclude that this concern 
is an important value in EU law. 
What approach is developed in EU competition law to national security 
systems that amount to economic activities? The two most significant rulings con-
cerning social security and EU competition law concern the Albany cases136 and 
AG2R (already mentioned). The first cases are about supplementary pension 
schemes, whereas in the last case a supplementary health care scheme was at 
issue. It is apparent from these cases that the CJEU assesses social security 
schemes (constituting economic activities) under Article 106 (2) TFEU. Pursuant to 
this provision undertakings entrusted with the operation of a Service of General 
Economic Interest (hereafter SGEI) may restrict competition, if this is necessary 
with a view to the proper implementation of this task. In this respect, it should 
be noted that it is settled case law that not only the SGEI providers can invoke 
this exception but also Member States are entitled to do so.137  
Correspondingly, the management of an ‘economic’ social security system is 
framed as a SGEI and competition restrictions are permitted, in so far as they 
are necessary. As Article 106 (2) TFEU regards, two important tests must be 
carried out: 1) a SGEI mission should be entrusted by the State to the enter-
prise concerned138 2) without restricting competition this SGEI provider cannot 
perform its task under economically acceptable circumstances.139 In this respect, 
the CJEU has pointed out that restriction of competition is not justified if the 
SGEI mission at state concerns services that can be dissociated from the SGEI 
concerned and satisfy specific needs of economic operators.140 How did the 
CJEU apply these tests to the two social security systems in question? 
In Albany social partners had set up a supplementary pension scheme by 
means of a collective agreement. The management of this task was assigned to 
a Fund. Pursuant to Dutch law, affiliation to this Fund was compulsory. The CJEU 
found that the body managing the supplementary pension scheme was en-
trusted with a SGEI mission as it fulfilled an essential social function ‘... by rea-
                                         
136 Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie 
[1999] ECR I-5751, Joined cases C-115/97, C-116/97 and C-117/97, Brentjens’ Han-
delsonderneming BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel in Bouwmaterialen 
[1999] ECR I-6025 and case C-219/97, Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV v. Stichting 
Pensioenfonds voor de Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven [1999] ECR I-6121. 
137 See for example, Case C-203/96, Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp v. Minister van 
Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer [1998] ECR I-4075. See also A. 
Jones & B. Sufrin, op. cit., p. 599. 
138 See e.g. case C-159/94, EDF [1997] ECR I-5851. 
139 See Case C-320/91, Criminal proceedings against Paul Corbeau [1993] ECR I-2533. 
140 See para. 10 of Corbeau. 
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son of the limited amount of the statutory pension ...’.141 What is striking about 
this reasoning is that it not only contains the CJEU’s view on the level of benefits 
of the Dutch statutory pension scheme142 but also fails to pay attention to the 
requirement of a clear act of entrustment of a SGEI task. Probably, the CJEU 
derived the special task from the exclusive right granted to the managing body 
concerned. It is apparent from the facts of the Albany cases that under Dutch 
law the management of supplementary pension schemes is granted as an ex-
clusive right to particular providers. The CJEU also applied the test of the eco-
nomically acceptable circumstances. It contended that restriction of competition 
was necessary because otherwise the progressive departure of ‘good risks’ 
would leave the managing body involved with an increasing share of ‘bad 
risks’.143 By stressing the risk profiles of the affiliates the CJEU showed its will-
ingness to solve a serious market failure, i.e., adverse selection and the prob-
lem of cherry picking resulting from it. Unfortunately, the CJEU did not examine 
whether some services could be dissociated from the SGEI mission concerned. 
Then again, it cannot be ruled out that this was not necessary as the exclusive 
right to provide the supplementary pension scheme was well defined. 
In AG2R collective partners had also set up a supplementary scheme, which 
in this case concerned the cover of health costs. As the applicable French laws 
were differently drafted from the laws at issue in the Dutch Albany case, the 
body, to which the task of the management of the scheme was assigned, did 
not have an exclusive (or special) right. The CJEU contended that this body was 
entrusted with a SGEI task, as the scheme at issue was characterized by a high 
degree of solidarity and particular constraints were imposed in order to ensure 
access for all.144 Consequently, the entrustment was derived from the role that 
solidarity played in the scheme and the obligations that were imposed on 
AG2R. What is striking, is that in this approach no explicit act of entrustment is 
required. The problem is that, as a result, the boundaries of the SGEI mission 
are not clear. Therefore, it was difficult to carry out a good proportionality 
test. The CJEU found that the competition restrictions caused by the SGEI mis-
sion at stake were justifiable, as persons with a low risk profile should be pre-
vented from taking insurance policies from other companies, which would leave 
the managing body with a too large share of persons with a high risk profile. 
Again, the problem of adverse selection and cherry picking was addressed. 
However, it is was not clear at all whether the cover provided by the managing 
body was too broad, since the boundaries of the SGEI mission were not well 
                                         
141 See para. 150 of Albany. 
142 Apparently, this level was too low in the eyes of the CJEU. 
143 See para. 108 of Albany. 
144 See para. 17 of AG2R Prévoyance. 
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defined. In other words, it remained unclear whether particular insurance ser-
vices could be dissociated from the core task of the managing body concerned. 
In sum, the experience with applying the competition rules to social security sys-
tems is very limited at present. Nevertheless, the these rules will become rele-
vant, if Member States introduce more competition in these systems in order to 
make them efficient, as is required in many recommendations issued by the 
Council under the SGP rules. In that case, it may be expected that many com-
petition distortions will be identified, as compulsory affiliation is at the heart of 
many social security schemes and prevents other economic operators from pro-
viding similar cover. Consequently, the compatibility with EU competition law 
will then be highly depended on the interpretation of Article 106 (2) TFEU. It is 
worrying that to date no coherent approach to social security systems and SGEI 
is developed. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Competition is a central value in the EU rules on the SGP, the internal market 
and competition law. Therefore, this is an overarching value that ties the SGP 
measures on the one hand and the internal market and EU competition rules on 
the other hand together. One could consider this as a first step towards one 
comprehensive system of European economic law. An important element of 
competition is the enhancement of efficiency and as a result cost reductions, 
which leads savings on the public budgets, is also a significant component. 
It is striking that all three areas of European economic law have impact on 
the national social welfare states. But the most sweeping steps are taken in the 
context of the SGP rules.145 From the analysis of this paper it is apparent that 
all aspects of the social welfare states are targeted and the Member States 
are recommended to introduce competition in various social security systems in 
order to enhance their efficiency. These steps are, however, not isolated from 
the developments that have taken place in EU internal market and competition 
law. More in particular, the CJEU has not shied away from bringing social secu-
rity systems within the ambit of the Treaty provisions on free movement and 
competition. As a result, by following the SGP recommendations the Member 
States are forced to observe these provisions with regard to their efficiency-
based social security systems. In my view, an important transformation that 
could result from the SGP rules is the increasing importance of the free move-
ment and competition rules for the social welfare states and, more in particular, 
for the social security systems. Admittedly, it is too early to draw this conclusion, 
as the six-pack measures were adopted only one year ago. But the 2012 set 
of recommendations gives an intriguing impression of the policy areas that are 
included in the economic analyses.  
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It cannot be excluded that the SGP could lead to competence creep into 
the social welfare states, as its point of departure is an integrated approach to 
the economic and financial state of affairs in a Member State. As the com-
petiveness of a particular country does not only depend on the enforcement of 
the competition rules, but also on matters, such as the organization of social 
security, the SGP recommendations will, inter alia, be aimed at tackling impor-
tant problems of the social welfare states. As a result, the division of compe-
tences between the EU and its Member States, as envisaged by the TFEU, will 
evolve. This is a great incentive for the EU institutions, such as the Commission 
and the CJEU, to interpret and to apply the competition and internal market 
rules even more expansively than they do now. Accordingly, the emergence of 
a coherent set of European economic rules, that integrate EU Competition and 
Internal Market law with the SGP rules, could have far-reaching consequences 
for national welfare policies. 
It is important that consequences resulting from the application of the SGP 
rules are anticipated adequately. Although the CJEU has handed down some 
brave judgments, to date there is not much case law on how to apply the EU 
free movement and competition rules to the national welfare states. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to further develop an EU approach to the application of 
these rules to the national welfare states.  
Or to put it differently, it is inevitable that such an approach will be devel-
oped. The institutions involved in the enforcement of the SGP, free movement 
and competition rules are forced to come up with such an approach, as they 
are confronted with the question how to balance competition and social wel-
fare state concerns. In my view, traces of the development of such an approach 
are already discernible in the current SGP recommendations and the case law 
on the competition and internal market rules. 
As already pointed out, competition and efficiency are values acknowl-
edged in EU law. But also values that are not, or at least not primary, of an 
economic nature are recognised in European economic law as well. Solidarity 
and access for all to essential services were, for example, mentioned both in 
the SGP recommendations and the CJEU’s case law on competition and the in-
ternal market. In other words, European economic rules are used to develop 
social principles and values. Under EU internal market and competition law the 
spill over-effect was considerable between these rules on the one hand and the 
social welfare state on the other hand. With the SGP rules in operation, the 
floodgates are open. 
Therefore, the economic and social values need to be elaborated on in or-
der to develop a comprehensive set of economic rules that do justice to the 
highly competitive social market economy, on which the EU is built according to 
Article 3 (3) TEU. 
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To conclude, it should be noted that democracy is a very important value 
of EU law. The analysis carried out in this paper shows that the rules that de-
termine the direction of the national welfare states in Europe are developed 
by EU institutions, such as the Council, the Commission and the CJEU. The in-
volvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments is very lim-
ited. This is a great concern, as the democratic legitimacy of the newly emerg-
ing area of EU economic law is at stake. Therefore, the development of a com-
prehensive set of values should be put high on the agenda in the years to come 
and absolute priority should be given to making the process of saving the euro 
and enhancing the competiveness of the EU more democratic. 
In sum, much work needs still to be done, but the EU measures taken in the 
wake of the current financial and economic crisis could lead -not wholeheart-
edly, but rather step by step, pushing reluctant Member State with great 
budget deficits forward- to an even closer Union. 
 
 
